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BREAKING UP THE FOCUS ON RELATIONSHIPS
FOR NONPECUNIARY INSIDER TRADING
PERSONAL BENEFITS
Bradley Larkin*
In 1983, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the “personal benefit”
requirement as an objective test for insider trading to help determine when
confidential information is tipped for an improper purpose. Under this test,
a tipper acts improperly by receiving a personal benefit for sharing
confidential, nonpublic information, even if the tipper does not trade using
the information. For instance, when a tipper leaks confidential information
to a trading friend or relative, the tipper benefits personally because this
amounts to trading on the confidential information and then gifting the
profits. The personal benefit requirement is applied differently among the
circuits, however, and the Second Circuit has changed its interpretation of
the personal benefit test three times since 2014. Currently, it requires
prosecutors to show a meaningfully close personal relationship between
tipper and tippee using evidence suggesting either a quid pro quo
relationship or the tipper’s intention to benefit the tippee. This Note argues
that personal benefit tests that evaluate the closeness of a tipper-tippee
relationship detracts from the Supreme Court’s goal of separating tips leaked
for proper and improper purposes. Instead, this Note proposes two distinct
tests for nonpecuniary personal benefits: one test for gifts of confidential
information and another test for a tipper’s intention to benefit a particular
recipient. The new test for gifts would apply to anyone, not just close friends
or family members, but would require prosecutors to prove the tipper’s intent
to gift the information. The new test for determining whether a tipper
intended to benefit a particular recipient would establish a rebuttable
presumption that the tipper disclosed information for a proper purpose. The
prosecution could overcome this presumption with evidence of an improper
purpose for the disclosure. These two tests would help to implement the goals
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INTRODUCTION
In current jurisprudence, criminal violations for insider trading fall under
the umbrella of securities fraud and do not constitute distinct crimes. The
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Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (the “Exchange Act”) does not explicitly
prohibit insider trading.2 Since the passage of the Exchange Act, neither
Congress nor the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have defined
insider trading because both worried that a specific definition would limit the
broad and flexible language in section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, which was
designed to react to developments in the securities industry.3 Recognizing
this ambiguity, the current SEC Commissioner Robert J. Jackson, Jr. and
former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Preet
Bharara recently formed the Bharara Task Force on Insider Trading
(“Bharara Task Force”) to consider insider trading reforms.4 Tipper-tippee
liability is one subset of insider trading liability that the Bharara Task Force
may seek to reform.
To better discuss the elements of tipper-tippee insider trading liability, this
Note will first define certain key terms. A “tipper” is someone who discloses
material nonpublic information (MNPI) to another person.5 A “tippee” is the
person who receives the MNPI and trades on that information.6 “Material”
describes any information that a reasonable person would consider important
before deciding to trade securities.7 “Nonpublic” means any information
“not widely disseminated or . . . received with the expectation it will remain
confidential.”8 For a tippee to be criminally liable for insider trading, a tipper
must receive a “personal benefit” from tipping the MNPI.9
Part of the ambiguity the Bharara Task Force must resolve stems from the
Second Circuit’s affirmation of Mathew Martoma’s conviction for securities
fraud in United States v. Martoma10 (Martoma I) and United States v.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012).
2. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, An Overview of Insider Trading Law and Policy: An
Introduction to the Research Handbook on Insider Trading, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
INSIDER TRADING 1, 1–2 (Stephen M. Bainbridge ed., 2013); Jon Eisenberg, Insider Trading
Law After Salman, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/18/insider-trading-law-after-salman/
[https://perma.cc/6D8D-UZGJ].
3. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 13 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2286; H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 92 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N.
321, 323–24; Corporate Take-Overs and Insider Trading Scandals in the 1980s, SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/
raisingStakes_a.php [https://perma.cc/GR8P-9KN6] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) [hereinafter
SEC Historical Society 1980s Scandals].
4. Preet Bharara & Robert J. Jackson Jr., Opinion, Insider Trading Laws Haven’t Kept
Up with the Crooks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/
opinion/sec-insider trading-united-states.html [https://perma.cc/235X-4T8B].
5. See Sara Almousa, Note, Friends with Benefits?: Clarifying the Role Relationships
Play in Satisfying the Personal Benefit Requirement Under Tipper-Tippee Liability, 23 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2016).
6. See id.
7. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
8. SHEELAH KOLHATKAR, BLACK EDGE 119 (2017) (quoting a slide presentation of
former SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt at SAC Capital).
9. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663–64 (1983) (noting that examples of personal benefits
include pecuniary gain, reputational benefit, quid pro quo, an intention to benefit a particular
recipient, and a gift to a close friend or family member who trades).
10. 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018).
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Martoma11 (Martoma II). Dr. Sidney Gilman tipped confidential drug trial
information to Martoma, who traded using the information.12 Martoma’s
appeal raised the issue of whether Dr. Gilman personally benefited from
tipping the information, which was a necessary element for Martoma’s
liability.13 Martoma paid Dr. Gilman $1000 per hour for consulting sessions
but did not pay for the sessions in which Dr. Gilman leaked the confidential
information.14
Initially, a three-judge panel found that the jury instructions regarding the
closeness of Dr. Gilman and Martoma’s relationship were not erroneous and
the evidence sufficiently established that Dr. Gilman personally benefited
because sharing the confidential information with Martoma helped develop
their friendship.15 The same three-judge panel later issued an amended
opinion and clarified that while the jury instructions were erroneous
regarding the necessary closeness of Martoma and Dr. Gilman’s relationship,
this error did not prejudice Martoma because the evidence implied a quid pro
quo between Martoma and Dr. Gilman.16 In effect, the panel switched
theories to understand Dr. Gilman’s personal benefit: the first opinion found
that developing the friendship provided the benefit and the second opinion
found that the benefit arose from the quid pro quo relationship. Congress
and the SEC must reform tipper-tippee liability to prevent prosecutors from
substituting theories to more easily establish a tipper’s personal benefit and
to encourage more consistent applications of personal benefit tests.
Officials and scholars still debate how to define the relevant standards and
goals for insider trading liability. The debates and uncertainties regarding
the purposes of insider trading regulations complicate consistent enforcement
attempts. The Exchange Act’s goals include ensuring fair and honest pricing
mechanisms for securities, fair dealing in securities without advantages for
certain investors, economically efficient costs for securities transactions, and
open and orderly markets to the extent practical.17 Some scholars argue that
limiting liability for insider trading decreases investor protection and reduces
fairness in securities markets.18 Others argue that permitting more insider
trading helps promote efficient capital markets and improves the accuracy of
securities prices.19
Judges also disagree about how to interpret and apply insider trading
regulations and legislative intent. In the 1977 case Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green,20 the U.S Supreme Court stated that the fundamental purpose of

11. 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018).
12. Id. at 69.
13. Id. at 67; see Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663.
14. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 69.
15. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 73.
16. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 68.
17. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91–92 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 322–23.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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the Exchange Act was to promote full disclosure.21 Three years later, in
Chiarella v. United States,22 the Court backtracked and stated that “neither
the Congress nor the [SEC] ever has adopted a parity-of-information rule.”23
The Chiarella majority held that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act does not
require disclosure for mere possession of MNPI.24
The Supreme Court in the 1980s established the foundation for much of
the current jurisprudence regarding insider trading.25 In the 1983 case Dirks
v. SEC,26 the Court identified when tippees must abstain from trading after
receiving MNPI.27 The Court found that a tippee only assumes a fiduciary
duty to abstain from trading if: (1) the tipper breached a fiduciary duty; (2)
the tippee knew or should have known that the tipper breached that duty; and
(3) the tipper personally benefitted from disclosing the tip (the “personal
benefit” requirement).28 Because courts often cannot definitively determine
the intent of a tipper who shares MNPI, the Supreme Court used the personal
benefit requirement to help identify when tippers disclose information for
improper purposes.29
Courts struggle to consistently apply tests involving nonpecuniary benefits
to tippers, such as when the tipper gifts the information to a friend or relative
or intends to benefit a particular recipient.30 Gifting confidential information
to a trading friend or relative qualifies as a personal benefit; the Supreme
Court analogized this to tippers trading on the information themselves and
then gifting the proceeds to the tippee.31 “Tipping chains” best illustrate the
issues for nonpecuniary personal benefits, and chains occur when the tippee
who trades on the MNPI is several people removed from the insider who
originally disclosed the information.
A hypothetical shows the dilemma juries face when attempting to infer the
personal benefit received by a tipper. A hedge fund trader attempts to gather
information to make beneficial trades for her hedge fund. The trader makes
financial models and interviews professionals but also discovers information
about two companies’ earnings statements that have not yet been released.
The trader uses this information to make profitable trades for her hedge fund.
Insiders at each company previously released this earnings information to
investor-relations teams, but it is unclear how the information leaked from
the investor-relations teams to the trader. The information passed through
several people before coming to the trader. The trader previously gave career
advice to one of the insiders and went to church with another. Based on these
21. Id. at 477–78.
22. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
23. Id. at 233.
24. Id. at 235.
25. See infra Parts I.A.3–4. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella,
445 U.S. 222.
26. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
27. Id. at 654, 659–60.
28. Id. at 660–62.
29. Id. at 662–63.
30. See infra Part I.C.
31. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664.
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facts, should the trader face insider trading liability because the insiders
gifted the information or intended to benefit the trader?
The above hypothetical represents a similar fact pattern to that found in
United States v. Newman.32 In Newman, the Second Circuit established a
heightened standard to reduce convictions in cases with more remote and
tenuous tipper-tippee relationships.33 Prior to Newman, prosecutors won
eighty-five consecutive insider trading cases in the Second Circuit between
2009 and 2014 due to less stringent requirements necessary to infer a
personal benefit from a gift.34 The Newman standard used a two-element test
to determine whether the prosecution successfully proved the personal
benefit requirement for a gift. The first element required that the tipper and
tippee develop or maintain a “meaningfully close personal relationship.”35
The second element required that the relationship cause an exchange
involving a potential pecuniary gain or something similarly valuable in
nature.36
After Newman, scholars began using the term “gift theory” to describe the
relevant tipper personal benefit.37 Gift theory usually describes the personal
benefit received when a tipper gifts confidential information to friends or
family.38 Vague language from Dirks also allows courts to interpret an
intention to benefit a particular recipient as a tipper personal benefit under
gift theory.39 This makes sense because when giving a gift, the giver intends
to benefit the recipient, and thus any intentional benefit should also qualify
as a gift. However, the distinction becomes murkier when applied. For
instance, imagine that a tenant shares MNPI with a doorman. A facial review
of the facts may suggest that the tenant gifted the MNPI to the doorman to
help the doorman make a profitable trade. But, the tenant may have
inadvertently leaked the tip.
Under Newman, to determine if a personal benefit exists due to a gift of
MNPI, the court must first look at the relationship between the tenant and the
doorman. Although the tenant and doorman maintain a relationship, the issue
remains whether the relationship is meaningfully close and personal.
Additional tests to determine an appropriate closeness of the relationship may
draw the court’s focus away from the original question of insider trading to
whether the tipper shared the MNPI for an improper purpose.
32. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) (overturning the convictions of Todd Newman and
Anthony Chiasson for securities fraud in the Southern District of New York).
33. Id. at 448; see infra Part I.C.1.
34. Katherine Drummonds, Note, Resuscitating Dirks: How the Salman “Gift Theory”
of Tipper-Tippee Personal Benefit Would Improve Insider Trading Law, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
833, 841–42 (2016).
35. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
36. Id.
37. Gift theory is also sometimes called tipper-tippee liability or tipper liability. See
generally Drummonds, supra note 34.
38. Abigail Bush, Note, A Friend in Need May Get You in Trouble for Insider Trading
Indeed: An Argument for the Meaningfully Close Personal Relationship Definition of
Friendship Under the Gift Theory, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (2018).
39. See infra Part I.C.4.
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The Supreme Court, the Second Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit have all
heard appeals regarding the application of personal benefit tests since 2014.
In United States v. Salman,40 the Ninth Circuit declined to follow Newman’s
two-element test and instead followed the Dirks precedent for personal
benefits from gifts of MNPI.41 The Supreme Court granted certiorari for
Salman and agreed that Dirks resolved the issue easily.42 The Court also
abrogated the second element of Newman because its requirement of a
pecuniary gain or something similarly valuable lacked consistency with
Dirks.43
After Salman, the Second Circuit reexamined the remaining
“meaningfully close personal relationship”44 element of the Newman test in
Martoma I.45 Initially, a majority of a three-judge panel relied on the
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Salman to abrogate this element of the
Newman test.46 Ten months later, the same panel and two-judge majority
issued an amended opinion that no longer completely rejected the Newman
test.47 The majority found that a jury cannot declare that a trading relative or
friend received a personal benefit through a gift without finding “either that
tipper and tippee shared a relationship suggesting a quid pro quo or that the
tipper gifted confidential information with the intention to benefit the
tippee.”48
Insider trading jurisprudence and scholarship show that courts need
reforms to more consistently apply personal benefit tests for nonpecuniary
benefits. Prosecutors argue for a broad standard for gifts that applies to
everyone, not just to friends or family.49 The Supreme Court has rejected
such a broad standard multiple times50 and acted only to revert case law back
to the Dirks precedent.51 The Second Circuit has changed its gift theory
personal benefit test three times since 2014.52 Investors and securities
professionals want a standard that more clearly defines insider trading
violations and reduces reliance on circumstantial or subjective evidence
showing the closeness of a relationship between tippers and tippees.53
The confusion over gift theory has created two questions. First, how
should insider trading law define the relationship standards for gifts of
MNPI? Second, how should the law distinguish between gifted tips and tips
40. 792 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
41. Id. at 1092.
42. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016).
43. Id. at 428.
44. United States v. Newman 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
45. Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018).
46. Id.
47. Martoma II, 894 F.3d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 2018).
48. Id. at 68.
49. See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 426 (2016).
50. See id. at 426–27; Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 656 (1983); Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
51. See Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427.
52. See infra Part I.C.
53. See infra Part I.C.1.
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intended to benefit a particular recipient? These questions also include
corollary questions of how to draw boundaries for the requisite closeness of
relationships for gifts to friends and how to apply liability standards in cases
involving remote tippees in tipping chains.
This Note resolves the tension regarding gift theory personal benefit tests.
Part I explains the development of insider trading jurisprudence from the
1960s to the Martoma II decision in 2018. Part II contrasts theories that argue
that insider trading promotes efficient capital markets and more accurately
prices securities against theories that argue that regulations promote fairness
and protect investors from harm. Part III argues that courts should
distinguish personal benefits as gifts from those intended to benefit a
particular recipient and suggests the creation of new and distinct personal
benefit tests for each of the above categories. The new test for finding a
personal benefit to be a gift would require prosecutors to prove the scienter
element rather than the close relationship element. The new test for intention
to benefit a particular recipient would establish a rebuttable presumption of
legitimacy for disclosures.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSIDER TRADING LAWS
Enforcement and promulgation of federal securities regulations has
changed significantly since the passage of the Exchange Act. Part I traces
the development of insider trading jurisprudence from the passage of the
Exchange Act through the Martoma II decision. Part I.A explains how the
Supreme Court rejected an equal-access-to-information standard and instead
required a breach of fiduciary duty to find nondisclosure fraudulent. The
Court also added the personal benefit requirement for cases involving tippers.
Part I.B describes how the SEC expanded insider trading liability by
promulgating Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) and Rule 10b-5-2 and
by persuading the Supreme Court to adopt the “misappropriation theory.”
Part I.C shows how standards for finding that a gift conferred the personal
benefit changed after the Newman, Salman, Martoma I, and Martoma II
decisions. Part I.D discusses two theories about the appropriateness of a
closeness requirement for friendships and how to apply tests that accurately
determine a relationship’s closeness.
A. Competing Theories of Equal Access and Fiduciary Duty
Part I.A details the development of insider trading jurisprudence from the
Exchange Act to the Dirks decision. Part I.A.1 explains how the Exchange
Act and Rule 10b-5 apply to insider trading. Part I.A.2 describes how the
Second Circuit sided with the SEC’s view that investors should have equal
access to MNPI by adopting a broad rule requiring anyone to disclose or
abstain from trading when they possess MNPI. Part I.A.3 then explains how
the Supreme Court rejected the “equal access” rule and implemented the
“fiduciary duty” rule for securities fraud. Finally, Part I.A.4 describes the
Supreme Court’s addition of the personal benefit requirement as an objective
test for determining improper purposes for tips of MNPI.
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1. Early Regulations: The Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
Following the stock market crash in 1929, Congress established federal
regulation of securities markets by passing the Securities Act of 193354 (the
“Securities Act”) and the Exchange Act in 1934.55 The Exchange Act created
the SEC and gave it broad power to prevent unscrupulous traders from
manipulating the sale of securities on a national security exchange.56 Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act bans anyone from directly or indirectly using any
manipulative or deceptive device to contravene any rules the SEC prescribes
to protect investors or the public interest.57 Nothing in the original text of
the Exchange Act specifically mentioned insider trading.58 Despite this
omission, legislative history supported the SEC’s decision to use the broad
language and delegation of authority in section 10(b) to develop a flexible
standard for securities fraud that applies to any developments in the securities
industry and to new forms of manipulation or deceit.59 Using this flexible
standard, the SEC originally interpreted section 10(b) to require traders to
fully disclose any MNPI in an effort to promote fairness in the securities
industry.60
The SEC first exercised its rulemaking authority under section 10(b) in
1942 by promulgating Rule 10b-5.61 Similar to the language in section 10(b),
the SEC enacted Rule 10b-5 as a broad rule to protect investors and combat
securities fraud.62 Rule 10b-5 specifically prohibits anyone from using any
device or scheme to defraud, make untrue statements or omit statements of
material fact, or engage in acts of fraud or deceit regarding the purchase or
sale of securities.63 Despite the general provisions of Rule 10b-5, only eleven
people were convicted of insider trading from 1942 to 1984.64 However, the
SEC waited until 1961 to categorize insider trading as a violation of Rule
10b-5, which likely limited the number of criminal convictions for insider
trading.65

54. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2012)).
55. Pub. L. No. 73-110, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78
(2012)); see also Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1.
56. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 1–2.
57. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
58. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 2; Eisenberg, supra note 2.
59. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 13 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2286.
60. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934—Principles of Full Disclosure, SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/
fullDisclosure_a.php [https:// perma.cc/H866-SRVT] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
61. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 2; see 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2019).
62. See Lewis D. Lowenfels, Codification and Rule 10b-5, 23 VAND. L. REV. 591, 596
(1970).
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
64. 134 Cong. Rec. 23,601 (1988) (statement of Rep. Eckart).
65. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 3.
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2. Texas Gulf Sulphur’s Equal-Access Rule
In the 1968 case SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,66 the Second Circuit
adopted a rule from the earlier SEC decision Cady, Roberts & Co.67 and
established a broad standard for insider trading liability.68 Texas Gulf
Sulphur (TGS), a drilling company, discovered a mine in early November
1963.69 TGS verified the drilling find in early April after completing a land
acquisition program in the find area.70 Between November and the middle
of April 1964, defendants’ ownership of TGS stock and call options
increased dramatically and TGS issued stock options to $26 of its officers
and employees.71 TGS’s stock price rose from $17 on November 15 to $36
on April 16 (the day the find was announced) and to over $58 on May 15.72
The SEC filed a complaint against certain TGS officers, directors, and
employees and alleged violations of Rule 10b-5 because the defendants either
purchased TGS stock or options on the basis of MNPI, shared the MNPI with
other traders, or recommended the purchase of TGS stock to other traders.73
TGS also issued a deceptive press release on April 12.74
Hearing two defendants’ appeals of their convictions and the SEC’s
appeals of the other dismissals, the Second Circuit interpreted the purpose of
the Exchange Act to be the promotion of fairness in securities transactions
and prevention of inequitable and unfair practices.75 The court adopted the
Cady, Roberts & Co. rule that anyone in possession of MNPI must disclose
the information before trading on it or abstain from trading.76 The court
defined “materiality” as any information that a reasonable person would
deem important in deciding a course of action for the transaction in
question.77 The court held that Rule 10b-5 requires that all investors should
have equal access to rewards and face identical market risks in securities
transactions.78
Although the Second Circuit established a broad “disclose or abstain” rule
in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green clarified that Rule 10b-5 violations still require manipulation or

66. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
67. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
68. Donald C. Langevoort, From Texas Gulf Sulphur to Chiarella: A Tale of Two Duties,
71 SMU L. REV. 835, 836 (2018); see also Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 911 (finding
that the SEC and courts “have consistently held that insiders must disclose material facts
which are known to them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with
whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment”).
69. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 843.
70. Id. at 843–44.
71. See id. at 844.
72. Id. at 847.
73. Id. at 839–42.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 848.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 849.
78. Id. at 851–52.

2019]

RELATIONSHIPS AND INSIDER TRADING

277

deception.79 Santa Fe Industries attempted to complete a merger with Kirby
Lumber Corp.80 After Morgan Stanley appraised the Kirby stock at $125 per
share, Santa Fe offered Kirby stockholders $150 per share.81 The Kirby
shareholders sued and claimed that the stock was worth $772 per share based
on physical assets and that Santa Fe violated Rule 10b-5 with its offer.82
In evaluating the claim for fraud under Rule 10b-5, the Court defined
manipulation as engaging in practices “that are intended to mislead investors
by artificially affecting market activity.”83 The Court held that section 10(b)
only regulates conduct involving manipulation or deception, and if neither
are present, a claim of fraud or fiduciary breach does not state a cause of
action under Rule 10b-5.84 Because Santa Fe’s offer lacked the necessary
manipulation or deception, the Court dismissed the alleged Rule 10b-5
violations and remanded for application of state law.85 Nothing in the
Court’s opinion, however, addressed the Second Circuit’s equal access rule.
3. Chiarella’s Fiduciary Duty Rule
In the 1980 case Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court considered
issues of equal access and the necessity of a fiduciary duty to clarify the scope
for insider trading liability.86 The defendant in the case, Vincent Chiarella,
worked for a financial printer; his duties included handling announcements
of corporate takeover bids.87 Although clients concealed the names of the
takeover companies before sending documents to his employer, Chiarella
still “deduce[d] the names of the target companies.”88 Chiarella never
publicly disclosed his knowledge; instead, he bought stock in the target
companies and sold the stock after the takeover attempts were announced.89
After an SEC investigation, the Second Circuit upheld Chiarella’s conviction
for violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.90 The Second Circuit held that
anyone who regularly receives MNPI incurs an affirmative duty to disclose
before using the information to trade securities.91
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed Chiarella’s
conviction.92 In a strategic decision, the Justice Department chose not to
present an argument in support of the Second Circuit’s holding regarding an
affirmative duty to disclose.93 Instead, the government argued that Chiarella
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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92.
93.

See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977).
Id. at 465.
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Id. at 467.
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Id. at 473–74.
See id. at 476–80.
See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231–33 (1980).
Id. at 224.
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Id. at 224–25.
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misappropriated the information and “deceived the source of the
information . . . because misappropriation itself triggers a duty to disclose.”94
Because the government failed to submit the misappropriation argument to
the jury during trial, the Supreme Court declined to review the argument on
procedural grounds.95
In its decision, the Supreme Court focused its discussion on the
prerequisite fiduciary duty required to prove fraud through nondisclosure
under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.96 Although the majority agreed
with Justice Harry Blackmun’s dissent that section 10(b) acts as a flexible
“catchall” provision,97 they found that fraud must be present to establish a
section 10(b) violation.98 Chiarella did not owe a fiduciary duty to the sellers
of the target company because he lacked any prior relationship with that
company.99 Chiarella, therefore, owed no duty to disclose before trading: a
necessary element to make his silence fraudulent.100
Upon examination of the language and legislative history of section 10(b),
the Court found no evidence of congressional intent to create a general duty
to forgo any actions based on MNPI.101 Accordingly, the Court held that
mere possession of MNPI does not create a duty to disclose under section
10(b).102 Because the trial judge only instructed the jury on Chiarella’s
failure to disclose and not on his duty to anyone other than the selling
company, the Court reversed his conviction.103 The Court also found that
“not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity
under § 10(b).”104 An insider unfairly trading on a corporation’s MNPI in
violation of a duty owed to that corporation became the basis for the
“traditional” or “classical” theory of insider trading liability.105
4. Dirks Introduces the Personal Benefit Element
In the 1983 case Dirks v. SEC, the SEC again attempted to expand the
definition of insider trading to encompass situations that leave traders with
unequal information, regardless of fiduciary duty.106 The SEC argued to
affirm its censure of the defendant for aiding and abetting insider trading.107
Raymond Dirks, a broker-dealer, received information from Ronald Secrist
94. Id.
95. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236–37. The misappropriation argument became the basis for
the “misappropriation theory” that the Supreme Court adopted in United States v. O’Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).
96. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–29.
97. Id. at 226, 246.
98. Id. at 234–35.
99. Id. at 232–33.
100. Id. at 232.
101. Id. at 233.
102. Id. at 235.
103. Id. at 236–37.
104. Id. at 232.
105. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
106. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 657–58 (1983).
107. Id. at 650–52.
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who alleged that his former employer, Equity Funding of America, was
engaging in fraudulent corporate practices.108 Secrist wanted Dirks to verify
and disclose the allegations of fraud.109 Dirks corroborated the fraud and
shared this information with several of his clients, who then sold their
holdings of Equity Funding securities.110 Dirks also urged the Wall Street
Journal to write a story and hoped that it would expose the fraud
allegations.111 Using what has been criticized as terrible enforcement
discretion,112 the SEC investigated Dirks and censured him for aiding and
abetting securities fraud.113
The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit’s affirmation of Dirks’s
censure.114 To support its censure, the SEC argued that anyone in possession
of MNPI has a duty to disclose or abstain from trading on that information
because tippees “inherit” the same duty as insiders for trading on MNPI.115
The Court rejected the SEC’s broad view of insider trading liability and
duty.116 The Court reaffirmed the principle from Chiarella that a duty to
disclose only arises from a relationship between parties and not from a
marketplace position that enables the acquisition of MNPI.117 The Court also
reaffirmed that liability for Rule 10b-5 violations derives from unfairly using
information intended only for corporate purposes and not for personal
benefit.118 A tippee’s duty to disclose or abstain derives from an insider’s
duty to disclose or abstain.119
To help courts identify when a tippee unfairly trades and violates a duty to
disclose, the Court added the personal benefit element for tippee insider
trading liability as an objective requirement.120 The Court noted that to
preserve a healthy market, the SEC recognizes that securities analysts must
“ferret out” nonpublic information to make analytical judgments.121
Nevertheless, the Court stated that analyst tippees cannot always trade on
information received.122 In its attempt to draw a line between permissible
and impermissible trades, the Court focused on whether tippers disclosed the
information for an improper purpose.123 An improper purpose for the
disclosure occurs when the tipper exploits the information for personal
gain.124 The Court also provided examples of tipper personal benefits,
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 648–49.
Id. at 649.
Id.
See id.
See Eisenberg, supra note 2.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650–52.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 651, 655–56.
See id. at 656–57.
Id. at 657–58.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 658–59.
Id. at 659.
See id. at 659–62.
Id. at 659.

280

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

including pecuniary gain and reputational benefit.125 The Court listed certain
circumstances that may create the inference of a personal benefit to the
insider: a relationship that suggests quid pro quo from the recipient or an
intention to benefit a particular recipient.126 “The elements of fiduciary duty
and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”127
Applying the personal benefit test to the case, the Supreme Court
determined that Secrist disclosed the information to Dirks to expose
corporate fraud.128 The Court found that Secrist “received no monetary or
personal benefit for revealing Equity Funding’s secrets, nor was their
purpose to make a gift of valuable information to Dirks.”129 The Court
brushed aside the SEC’s fears that defendants could manufacture proper
purposes for improper trades because the personal benefit test provides
objective criteria to determine the scienter element for securities fraud.130
Not only did the Supreme Court again reject the SEC’s equal access theory,
but it also instituted the personal benefit requirement as an additional obstacle
for the SEC to secure insider trading convictions.131
B. The SEC Wins the Long Game
With its equal access theory now twice rebuffed by the Supreme Court, the
SEC lobbied Congress, promulgated three new rules (10b-5-1, 10b-5-2, and
Reg FD), and argued Supreme Court cases to expand insider trading
liability.132 In response to public outrage from securities scandals in the
1980s, Congress passed the Insider Trading Sanctions Act133 (ITSA) in 1984
and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act134 (ITSFEA)
in 1988. ITSA allowed treble damages and increased the maximum criminal
fine for violations of the Exchange Act to $100,000.135 ITSFEA established
a private cause of action for insider trading victims, created a bounty system
125. Id. at 663.
126. Id. at 664.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 667.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 663.
131. Id. at 657–58, 664.
132. See SEC Historical Society 1980s Scandals, supra note 3; Power of SEC Resilience:
United States v. O’Hagan, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, http://
www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/resilience_b.php [https://perma.cc/59Q3-XVMQ]
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019); Old Debate and New Rules: SEC Regulation of Insider Trading
in the Global Marketplace, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST. SOC’Y, http://
www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/regulation_a.php [https://perma.cc/X4UX-6PNS]
(last visited Aug. 22, 2019) [hereinafter SEC Historical Society New Rules].
133. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)).
134. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2012)); see
also Congressional Deference to SEC Enforcement, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION HIST.
SOC’Y,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/raisingStakes_b.php
[https://
perma.cc/39TG-TY58] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) [hereinafter SEC Historical Society
Congressional Deference]; SEC Historical Society 1980s Scandals, supra note 3.
135. See SEC Historical Society 1980s Scandals, supra note 3.
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to reward informants with a percentage recovery of insider trading profits,
increased the maximum fine to $1 million, and set the maximum jail term at
ten years for insider trading.136
Despite these expansions of liability, Congress refused to adopt the
“misappropriation theory” that the Justice Department first argued in
Chiarella.137 This theory, referenced by the dissent in Chiarella, proposes
that because misappropriation triggers a duty to disclose, anyone who
misappropriates MNPI deceives the source of the information.138 Instead,
Congress largely deferred to the courts to continue developing insider trading
law.139
Part I.B.1 describes how the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation
theory. Part I.B.2 analyzes how the SEC promulgated Reg FD to limit the
practice of selective disclosure. Part I.B.2 also explains how the SEC
promulgated Rule 10b-5-2 to define relationships in situations where duties
of trust or confidence exist to help guide application of the misappropriation
theory.
1. O’Hagan Adopts Misappropriation Theory
In the 1997 case United States v. O’Hagan,140 the SEC finally convinced
the Supreme Court to adopt the misappropriation theory.141 The defendant,
James O’Hagan, worked as a partner at a law firm.142 His firm briefly
represented Grand Metropolitan PLC in 1988 in a potential tender offer for
the Pillsbury Company.143 O’Hagan did not work on the Pillsbury matter,
but he purchased call options and shares of Pillsbury stock beginning in
August and September, respectively, before his firm withdrew from
When Grand
representing Grand Metropolitan in September.144
Metropolitan announced the tender offer in October, O’Hagan sold his call
options and shares and made more than $4.3 million.145
A jury convicted O’Hagan of seventeen counts of securities fraud, twenty
counts of mail fraud, seventeen counts of fraudulent trading in connection
with a tender offer, and three counts of violating federal money laundering
136. See SEC Historical Society Congressional Deference, supra note 134.
137. See Langevoort, supra note 68, at 846; SEC Historical Society Congressional
Deference, supra note 134.
138. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
infra Part I.B.1 (discussing the misappropriation theory in more depth). See generally
Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (affirming the conviction of a journalist who
misappropriated information from his employer, the Wall Street Journal).
139. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 14 (1983), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274,
2287 (stating that misappropriation as a potential fraudulent act should “be left to further
judicial development”); 134 Cong. Rec. 23,600 (1988) (statement of Rep. Lent) (stating that
ITSFEA makes no change to substantive insider trading law).
140. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
141. Id. at 647.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 648.
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statutes.146 In a divided opinion, an Eighth Circuit panel reversed all of
O’Hagan’s convictions.147 The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s
decision.148
In reinstating O’Hagan’s convictions, the Court distinguished between the
classical theory and the misappropriation theory for insider trading
liability.149 Per Chiarella, a violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 occurs
under the classical theory “when a corporate insider trades in the securities
of his corporation on the basis of [MNPI].”150 The classical theory applies
to anyone who receives confidential information through a positional
relationship with a corporation, including temporary fiduciaries such as
attorneys.151 A violation of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 occurs under the
misappropriation theory when someone “misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary duty
owed to the source of the information.”152 The Court stated that the two
theories are complementary because the classical theory protects
shareholders from corporate insider abuse and the misappropriation theory
protects against abuse from outsiders with access to confidential
information—but no fiduciary duty.153
The Court found that misappropriation satisfies the deception requirement
under section 10(b) because “[a] fiduciary who ‘[pretends] loyalty to the
principal while secretly converting the principal’s information for personal
gain,’‘dupes’ or defrauds the principal.”154 A corporation has the exclusive
right to use confidential information and undisclosed misappropriations of
this information constitute fraud similar to embezzlement.155 The Court
limited the scope of liability and noted that “full disclosure forecloses
liability under the misappropriation theory” because it eliminates deception
of the information’s source.156 The Court found that O’Hagan’s failure to
disclose his trades using the misappropriated information violated section
10(b) and breached his duty to his firm and its client, Grand Metropolitan.157
2. Regulations Limit Disclosures and Define Duties of Trust or Confidence
In August 2000, over three years after the O’Hagan decision, the SEC
promulgated several regulations regarding disclosure, transactions involving

146. Id. at 648–49.
147. Id. at 649.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 651–52.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 643.
153. Id. at 652–53.
154. Id. at 653–54 (citation omitted) (quoting Brief for the United States at 17, United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (No. 96-842), 1997 WL 86306, at *17).
155. Id. at 654.
156. Id. at 655.
157. Id. at 660.
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MNPI, and the applicability of the misappropriation theory.158 The SEC
promulgated Reg FD to stop the practice of selective disclosure.159 Selective
disclosure occurs when a corporation discloses information to certain traders,
often institutional investors, who are likely to transact using that information
without disclosing it to the general public.160 Reg FD requires that whenever
issuers or their agents disclose MNPI to certain parties, they must publicly
disclose the information simultaneously for intentional disclosures and
promptly for unintentional disclosures.161 Reg FD attempted to strike a
balance that minimized informed trading on intentionally disclosed material
information without chilling securities analysts’ ability to perform
information-seeking interviews.162
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b5-2 to clarify to whom, and to which
duties, the misappropriation theory applies.163 Paragraph b specifies when
“duties of trust or confidence” exist, such as when the recipient of
information agrees to keep information confidential, knows or reasonably
should know that the disclosing party expects the recipient to maintain
confidentiality, or receives the information from a spouse, parent, child, or
sibling.164 Rule 10b5-2(b)(3), which covers information received from a
spouse, parent, child, or sibling, includes a presumption for liability unless
the receiver did not know or reasonably should not have known that the
source expected the information to be kept confidential.165 Like Dirks’s list
of personal benefits, this is a nonexhaustive list intended to help courts apply
insider trading liability under the misappropriation theory.166
C. New Judicial Developments for Gift Theory
Part I.C discusses the cases that the Supreme Court, Second Circuit, and
Ninth Circuit have heard since 2014 regarding the necessary closeness of a
tipper-tippee relationship to find a gift of MNPI to be personal benefit.
1. Newman Attempts a Heightened Standard
After the 2008 recession, the SEC increased its focus on prosecuting hedge
fund managers and employees.167 In United States v. Newman, the
158. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2019) (providing that any person with a direct, indirect,
or derivative duty of trust or confidence to an issuer, shareholder, or source of MNPI may not
buy or sell securities “on the basis of material nonpublic information” and outlining the
affirmative defenses available for eliminating insider trading liability); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b52 (2019); 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2019).
159. Merritt B. Fox et al., Informed Trading and Its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 893
(2018).
160. Id.
161. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a)(1)–(2).
162. Fox et al., supra note 159, at 893; see infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the societal benefits
and drawbacks of different types of informed trading).
163. See Eisenberg, supra note 2; SEC Historical Society New Rules, supra note 132.
164. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b).
165. Id.
166. See Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 13.
167. See Eisenberg, supra note 2.

284

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

government presented evidence that Todd Newman and Anthony Chiasson
employed analysts who directly or indirectly exchanged information about
companies’ earnings statements after obtaining the information from
corporate insiders.168 Newman and Chiasson then traded on this information
and earned $4 million for Newman’s managed funds and $68 million for
Chiasson’s managed funds.169 Newman and Chiasson were several levels
removed from the corporate insider tippers and each argued that the
government presented no evidence that any tipper received a personal
benefit.170 The district court rejected the defendants’ argument and proposed
jury instructions that claimed that the Second Circuit’s decision in SEC v.
Obus171 did not require explanation of a personal benefit to the tipper as a
separate element for insider trading liability.172
On appeal, the defendants raised multiple challenges to their convictions,
including claims of insufficient evidence and erroneous jury instructions.173
Clarifying the elements of tippee liability articulated in Dirks, the Second
Circuit stated that “even in the presence of a tippers’ breach, a tippee is liable
only if he knows or should have known of the breach.”174 The Second Circuit
noted that the government did not identify any prior case where defendants
were as remote as Newman and Chiasson and were held criminally liable.175
While several people in the tipping chains previously knew each other and
even exchanged career advice or went to church together, the Second Circuit
found that these people were only casual acquaintances and that the
circumstantial evidence did not permit the court to infer a personal benefit.176
Furthermore, the prosecution presented no testimony that Newman and
Chiasson knew or consciously avoided knowing that they had traded on
information from insiders or that the insiders benefited from the
disclosures.177 When combined with the defendants’ evidence showing that
they had accurately modeled the earnings statements, the Second Circuit
found that the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendants had the intent to commit insider trading.178
The Second Circuit worried that if it accepted the government’s evidence
of a personal benefit, then “practically anything would qualify” as a personal
benefit, which would nullify that element for liability.179 Instead, the Second
Circuit attempted to clarify the gift example of a personal benefit from
Dirks.180 The court held that a jury cannot infer a personal benefit from a
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
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gift to a trading friend or relative “in the absence of proof of a meaningfully
close personal relationship that generates an exchange that . . . represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”181 This
two-element test established a heightened requirement for finding a personal
benefit from a gift and spawned later appeals in Salman and Martoma II.182
2. Salman Restores Dirks
In 2016, the Supreme Court in Salman v. United States183 accepted its first
insider trading case in almost two decades.184 Maher Kara worked as an
investment banker at Citigroup and his brother, Mounir “Michael” Kara,
began trading on information that Maher shared with him.185 Michael even
declined an offer from Maher for cash and preferred instead to receive the
lucrative trading information.186 Michael then shared the tips with his
brother-in-law, Bassam Salman.187 Using another relative who traded on his
behalf, Salman made over $1.5 million on trades using Maher’s
information.188 During Salman’s trial, the evidence at trial showed that
Maher and Michael had a close relationship and that Salman knew Maher
was supplying the information.189 The jury convicted Salman on all counts
and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction despite Salman’s argument that
the Ninth Circuit should adopt the heightened Newman personal benefit
standard.190
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the tension between the
Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit that stemmed from the Newman
decision.191 The Supreme Court held that Salman’s actions were “in the
heartland of Dirks’s rule concerning gifts” and adhered to the Dirks personal
benefit precedent.192 Because Salman conceded that the original disclosure
from Maher to Michael constituted a gift, the Court implied that this made
everyone in the tipping chain liable and provided enough evidence to sustain
Salman’s conviction.193 The Court also repudiated the second element of the
Newman test and held that requiring a tipper to receive something pecuniary
or similarly valuable in nature was inconsistent with Dirks.194

181. Id.
182. See generally Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); Martoma II, 894 F.3d
64 (2d Cir. 2018).
183. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
184. See Austin J. Green, Note, (Beyond) Family Ties: Remote Tippees in a Post-Salman
Era, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2771 (2017).
185. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 424.
186. Id. at 428.
187. Id. at 423–24.
188. Id. at 424.
189. Id. at 424–25.
190. Id. at 425; see United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
191. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425.
192. Id. at 429.
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3. Martoma I: Abrogating Newman Entirely
After the Supreme Court in Salman partially abrogated the Newman
holding without substantially changing insider trading law, the Second
Circuit was given another opportunity to revise its standard for inferring
personal benefits from gifts in Martoma I.195 Mathew Martoma managed an
investment portfolio focused on pharmaceutical and health-care companies
and paid Dr. Sidney Gilman, the chair of a safety committee monitoring the
clinical trials of a new drug, approximately $1000 per hour for approximately
forty-three consulting sessions.196 Martoma made trades in advance of the
announcement of the results of the trials that resulted in gains of
approximately $80 million and averted losses of over $194 million.197 The
jury convicted Martoma of two counts of securities fraud;198 he appealed,
claiming insufficient evidence and inadequate jury instructions under the
Newman standard.199
A three-judge panel heard Martoma’s appeal and issued a majority opinion
affirming his convictions in August 2017.200 The majority rejected
Martoma’s claim that there was insufficient evidence of Dr. Gilman’s
pecuniary gain even though Dr. Gilman did not charge Martoma for the two
sessions in which Dr. Gilman released the study data.201 The court
determined that the ongoing quid pro quo theory—that “Dr. Gilman regularly
disclosed confidential information in exchange for fees”—could lead a
rational trier of fact to find proof of all insider trading liability elements
“under a pecuniary quid pro quo theory.”202
The majority relied on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Salman to reject
Martoma’s inadequate jury instructions claim and abrogate Newman’s first
element that required a “meaningfully close personal relationship.”203 The
majority argued that Dirks never limited personal benefits to gifts from
“meaningfully close” friends and family members.204 The majority held that
Salman allowed an inference of a personal benefit from a gift whenever an
insider discloses information with the expectation that the tippee will trade
using the information.205 The majority found that the new rule would not
apply to all disclosures, such as inadvertent or whistleblowing disclosures,
and did not eliminate the personal benefit rule.206 The majority concluded

195. Martoma I, 869 F.3d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 2017), amended by 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018);
see also Peter J. Henning, Making Up Insider Trading Law as You Go, 56 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 101, 119 (2018).
196. Martoma I, 869 F.3d at 61.
197. Id. at 62.
198. Id. at 61.
199. Id. at 64.
200. Id. at 61.
201. Id. at 67.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 68.
205. Id. at 69–70.
206. Id. at 71.
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that “the district court’s instruction on gifts with the goal of developing
friendships . . . did not constitute ‘obvious’ error.”207 Even if the instruction
created an obvious error, the court held that the evidence of Dr. Gilman’s
financial benefit from his relationship with Martoma did not impair
Martoma’s substantial rights.208
In her dissent, Judge Rosemary S. Pooler contended that the jury
instructions were erroneous and that Newman could be abrogated without an
en banc hearing.209 Judge Pooler claimed that the majority’s holding
exceeded the “friends and family” limitation on finding a personal benefit
from a gift—established by Dirks—and instead applied gift theory to any
person.210 The dissent also argued that “[w]hat counts as a ‘gift’ is vague
and subjective,”211 and that the majority provided no further guidance on the
matter.212 Judge Pooler argued that the lack of guidance for juries to find
that a disclosure is a gift forces juries to make arbitrary and subjective
decisions.213 This undermines the objective intent element of the personal
benefit requirement.214 The dissent worried that the new rule would allow
the government to rely exclusively on circumstantial evidence rather than
objective facts in insider trading prosecutions.215 The dissent held that if
construed broadly, “the term ‘gift’ could cover nearly any disclosure, and
thus eliminate the personal benefit rule entirely.”216 Because the dissent
argued that the first element of the Newman test still applied, it concluded
that the jury instructions were plainly erroneous and not harmless.217
4. Martoma II: Newman Lives
Ten months after the initial opinion, the three-judge panel issued an
amended opinion and agreed that the jury instructions were inconsistent with
Newman but for different reasons than Mathew Martoma proposed.218 The
majority no longer rejected the “meaningfully close personal relationship”
element from Newman.219 Instead, the majority found that the jury
instructions were erroneous because they allowed the jury to find a personal
benefit from a gift without finding “either that tipper and tippee shared a
relationship suggesting quid pro quo or that the tipper gifted confidential
information with the intention to benefit the tippee.”220 The majority
nevertheless upheld Martoma’s conviction because the government
207.
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presented sufficient evidence that Dr. Gilman benefited through his quid pro
quo relationship with Martoma and through his intention to benefit Martoma
with the disclosure.221
The majority’s amended decision resulted primarily from a new
interpretation of the language in Dirks describing personal benefits. The
majority argued that the comma separating the “intention to benefit a
particular recipient” phrase from the “relationship suggesting quid pro quo”
phrase in Dirks severs any connection between them.222 Therefore, the court
held that the language regarding an intention to benefit should be read
independently from the language regarding relationships.223 The majority’s
holding allows proof of “a personal benefit with objective evidence of the
tipper’s intent, without requiring in every case some additional evidence of
the tipper-tippee relationship.”224
The Martoma II majority argued that Newman provided substantial
guidance for defining a “meaningfully close personal relationship” as
requiring that an insider intend to benefit the tippee or have a relationship
that suggests a quid pro quo.225 The majority interpreted Newman as limiting
the application of gift theory to only situations where one of the freestanding
personal benefits described above also applied.226 Using the above
interpretation, the majority agreed that Martoma received erroneous jury
instructions regarding the application of the personal benefit test; however,
the error did not impact Martoma’s substantial rights.227 The majority argued
that the district court properly instructed the jury on both of the freestanding
personal benefits necessary to satisfy the new personal benefit test.228 The
Second Circuit majority found that a rational trier of fact would have found
either the quid pro quo relationship or Dr. Gilman’s intent to benefit Martoma
sufficient.229
Judge Pooler again dissented, arguing that the majority redefined Newman
in subjective terms in derogation of circuit precedent.230 Judge Pooler
interpreted the personal benefit language from Dirks differently than the
majority and claimed that an intention to benefit a particular recipient also
requires evidence suggesting a quid pro quo relationship.231 In contrast, gifts
of MNPI operate as a distinct type of personal benefit because evidence that
suggests a quid pro quo relationship is not necessary for certain friendships

221. Id. at 71.
222. Id. at 74 (“The sentence, so understood, effectively reads, ‘there may be a relationship
between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or there may
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223. Id.
224. Id. at 75.
225. Id. at 77.
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and familial relationships.232 According to Judge Pooler, the majority’s
interpretation of Dirks limits proof of necessary objective facts to the
disclosure of MNPI but not to facts indicating that the tipper benefitted from
the relationship with the tippee.233
The dissent also argued that the majority’s interpretation conflicted with a
reading of Dirks as a whole and that a tipper’s intention to benefit a tippee
does not qualify as a personal benefit for the tipper.234 As in her dissent in
Martoma I, Judge Pooler believed that the majority’s amended opinion
replaced an objective test with a test that requires a subjective determination
of an intention to benefit.235 The personal benefit test purports to determine
the tipper’s purpose for the tip; however, the prosecution must only prove the
personal benefit, not the purpose.236 Focusing on the closeness of the
relationship between tipper and tippee provides better objective evidence that
disclosures to friends and relatives are gifts than attempting to determine the
tipper’s intentions.237 Because the instructions did not ask the jury whether
Dr. Gilman and Martoma shared a likely quid pro quo relationship or were
close enough friends that the information could be a gift, the dissent found
that the instructions were erroneous and not harmless.238
D. Post-Newman Relationship Personal Benefit Theories
Legal scholars continue to debate how courts should interpret the closeness
of the relationship between tipper and tippee in the personal benefit analysis.
Abigail Bush argues in favor of keeping the “meaningfully close personal
relationship” element from Newman as the correct definition of friendship
for personal benefits derived from gifts.239 Bush argues that a close
relationship provides indirect benefits to the tipper because it creates a
reasonable assumption that the tippee will share prosperity with the tipper
and because the relationship creates a feeling of obligation for the tipper to
provide for the tippee’s security and stability.240 Without such a relationship,
no reason exists to assume that either of the above benefits exist.241 Forcing
juries to determine if tippers reasonably expect tippees to trade on
information establishes a subjective, rather than objective, standard.242
Bush claims that personal benefits derived from gifts represent “the
minimum benefit that a tipper must gain to even be considered to have
personally benefitted from his disclosure of inside information.”243 Because
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
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gift theory under Dirks represents the floor for personal benefits, Bush argues
for interpreting the friendship requirement to confine liability to a narrower
set of relationships.244 Bush identifies factors which help determine whether
an appropriately close friendship exists: a history of engaging in social
activities directly together, a history of assisting one another with personal
issues, and the length of the relationship and frequency of interactions.245
Bush believes that courts can use prior case law to determine the sufficiency
of friendship through specific social activities as well as actions that show a
history of support.246 Prior cases also indicate that a higher frequency of
interactions over a longer period of time will support a finding of
friendship.247 These factors limit inferences for gift theory application and
help prevent the eradication of boundaries for disclosures established by
Dirks.248
Similar to Bush, Sara Almousa believes that courts must clarify the
relationships in which liability should attach for a personal benefit.249
Almousa identifies two ways to determine appropriately close relationships
that satisfy the personal benefit requirement: either the tipper must receive
an objective gain from disclosing the tip or the information must strengthen
the tipper’s relationship with any tippee who gains from using the
information.250 Almousa claims that her proposed standard shifts the focus
away from a relationship benefit between the original tipper and tippee and
instead focuses on whether any tippee in the chain benefitted.251 Almousa
concedes that her new standard would not resolve the Newman issue of
remoteness from the original tipper and may even make convicting remote
tippees more difficult.252 Nevertheless, Almousa argues that her standard
satisfies the objective purpose for the personal benefit requirement and
“potentially eliminates the need for prosecutors to prove that tippees knew
the information came from corporate insiders.”253
II. APPLYING INSIDER TRADING LAW AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TESTS
As the cases and theories discussed in Parts I.C and I.D demonstrate, courts
struggle to consistently define and apply tests for nonpecuniary personal
benefits. This struggle stems at least in part from attempts to create objective
criteria for liability standards and limit what juries may infer from
circumstantial evidence.254 Additionally, courts must attempt to balance the
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254. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983); United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438,
451–52 (2d Cir. 2014).

2019]

RELATIONSHIPS AND INSIDER TRADING

291

potentially conflicting goals of the Exchange Act.255 Scholars on one side
argue that insider trading regulations that promote efficiency in capital
markets and allow more forms of informed trading best accomplish the goals
of the Exchange Act.256 Those on the other side argue that regulations that
protect investors from harm and promote fair and beneficial securities
activities best accomplish the Exchange Act’s goals.257
To determine how to establish the best insider trading liability standards,
this Note reviews rationales and theories regarding economic efficiency,
accurate pricing, market fairness, and investor harm. Part II.A focuses on
theories arguing that insider trading prohibitions regulate securities
transactions inefficiently. Part II.B reviews theories that identify the harm
from insider trading and distinguish fair and beneficial securities activities
from harmful uses of MNPI.
A. “Efficient Capital Markets” Theories
Even prior to the Second Circuit’s decision in Texas Gulf Sulphur, Henry
Manne, a legal and economic scholar, suggested that prohibitions on insider
trading restrict the development of efficient capital markets.258 Specifically,
Manne makes two economic arguments against enforcement of insider
trading laws.259 First, insider trading helps price securities more efficiently
so markets reflect the true value of the securities more accurately.260 Second,
insider trading does not significantly harm long-term securities investors.261
Manne’s two arguments combine to suggest that permitting more insider
trading benefits long-term investors because investors receive more accurate
prices, which reduces market unfairness for securities transactions. Part
II.A.1 reviews claims that insider trading helps to more accurately price
securities. Part II.A.2 presents arguments that insider trading does not harm
long-term investors.
1. Accurate Pricing
Manne’s first argument that insider trading helps to more accurately price
securities finds widespread support; Manne himself claims that almost
nobody disagrees “that insider trading does always push the price of a stock

255. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91–92 (1975) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1975
U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323–24.
256. See infra Part II.A.
257. See infra Part II.B.
258. See generally HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
259. See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That
Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 168 (2005). Manne also argues that insider trading better
compensates innovative employees; however, this Note does not review that argument. For a
counterargument to Manne’s compensation claim, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Regulating
Insider Trading in the Post-Fiduciary Duty Era: Equal Access or Property Rights?, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INSIDER TRADING, supra note 2, at 80, 95–96.
260. Manne, supra note 259, at 168.
261. Id.
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in the correct direction.”262 Matt Levine, a columnist for Bloomberg, agrees
that insider trading helps markets function more efficiently and better
informs prices.263 Stephen Bainbridge believes that when a corporation
withholds material information, “the market can no longer accurately price
its securities.”264 Merritt Fox, Lawrence Glosten, and Gabriel Rauterberg
agree that “informed trading leads to more accurate share prices,” which
increases efficient economic allocation of resources.265 However, these
experts also argue that informed trading reduces market liquidity, which
creates inefficiencies and increases costs for securities transactions.266
In accord with views of the scholars above, the Supreme Court in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson267 adopted the “fraud-on-the-market” theory, which believes
that securities markets should accurately reflect all material public
information in the price of the security.268 Any material misstatement that
creates investor reliance and inaccurately affects the price of a security allows
a cause of action under Rule 10b-5.269 The fraud-on-the-market theory
allows investors to rely on the accuracy of stock prices, which corresponds
with the goals of the Exchange Act to ensure fair pricing mechanisms for
securities, fair dealing among all investors, and open and orderly securities
markets.270
In Basic, Combustion Engineering, Inc. discussed a possible merger with
Basic Inc.271 Between 1977 and 1978, Basic made three separate public
statements denying any merger negotiations.272 Basic finally suspended
trading on its stock and announced the merger and price in December
1978.273 Basic shareholders who sold their shares after the first denial but
before the merger announcement filed a class-action suit and claimed the
misstatements violated section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.274
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve circuit splits regarding the
standard of materiality and the presumption of reliance for the shareholder
class.275 The Court found that requiring shareholder plaintiffs to prove a
change of action due to the material misstatements “would place an
unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b–5 plaintiff who

262. Id. at 169.
263. Matt Levine, Insider Trading Isn’t So Simple, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Oct. 15, 2018,
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has traded on an impersonal market.”276 The Court noted that market
professionals usually consider most material public information—and this
affects stock prices.277 The Court further believed that all investors rely on
market integrity because an opposite presumption would lead to no public
investments in the stock market due to fears of rigged stock prices.278
Because announcements of material public information often affect stock
prices, the fraud-on-the-market theory presumes reliance on the
misstatements and posits that market prices should reflect the integrity and
accuracy of a security’s value.279
In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,280 the Supreme Court
denied another challenge to investor reliance on stock price accuracy and
Erica P. John Fund
reaffirmed the fraud-on-the-market theory.281
shareholders filed a class action suit alleging that Halliburton misrepresented
its potential liability in asbestos litigation.282 Halliburton pushed to overturn
Basic’s presumption of reliance, but the Supreme Court rejected this
argument and found that Halliburton relied on the economic arguments
rejected in Basic.283 The Court also found that Basic did not presume
complete efficiency in capital markets and the rebuttable presumption of
reliance accounted for the degree of market efficiency.284
Halliburton argued that value investors, who attempt to purchase
undervalued stocks or sell overvalued stocks, provide a counterexample to
the fraud-on-the-market theory and rebut the presumption that investors rely
on stock prices that accurately reflect the value of securities.285 While the
Court acknowledged that value investors exist, most uninformed investors
still rely on the presumption that the stock price of a security will reflect all
material public information.286
By preserving the fraud-on-the-market theory in the above cases, the
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of stock price accuracy for
uninformed investors. As noted above, a regulatory system that encourages
the most accurate pricing of securities corresponds with the goals of the
Fraud-on-the-market depends on material public
Exchange Act.287
announcements before the stock price adjusts and current jurisprudence does
not require companies to disclose all material information.288
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Allowing more insider trading would accelerate the accurate reporting of
securities prices. In contrast with rapid price changes following public
announcements of material information, allowing insider trading requires no
public announcement, and each trade gradually moves the price closer to the
correct value of the security.289 Insider trading may also reduce agency costs
by giving more market information to investors faster than regulated
disclosures.290 A return to the Texas Gulf Sulphur equal access rule for
MNPI may not increase disclosure because insiders can still refrain from
trading to avoid making negative disclosures.291 Investors prefer to obtain
as much accurate information as soon as possible because more information
can help investors make better trades.292 Allowing more insider trading by
creating heightened tests for finding a tipper personal benefit could increase
perceptions of rigged stock markets, but the information and accurate pricing
benefits may outweigh these investor fears.
2. Investor Harm
Manne’s second argument relies on a belief that a long-term investor
suffers no immediate damage when trading anonymously with an insider who
has MNPI.293 Bainbridge supports this argument because in an impersonal
market, the investor makes an independent decision to buy or sell the security
regardless of the fact that an insider acts on the other side of the
transaction.294 Bainbridge concedes that the investor may not transact if
given access to the same information that the insider possesses, but securities
lawmakers have been unwilling to require immediate disclosure of material
information in all circumstances.295 In Stuart Green and Matthew Kugler’s
study of the general public,296 the authors found that the subjects “were
unable to isolate the victim in one case from the victim in another.”297 The
authors concluded that rationales for banning insider trading cause confusion
for both lay people and legal professionals.298 If damage from insider trading
cannot be consistently identified, then this could cause issues for consistently
applying insider trading standards. Manne believes that harm from insider
trading occurs more frequently in theoretical literature than in the actual
market and this renders investor-protection benefits irrelevant for insider
trading regulations.299 Furthermore, diversified portfolios reduce risks to
289. Id.
290. Manne, supra note 259, at 180–81.
291. Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9
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individual investors and efficient capital markets establish rates of return that
reflect risk of investment.300
Even if insider trading harms individual investors, the current insider
trading jurisprudence still leaves gaps that do not benefit or protect
investors.301 Donald Langevoort believes that insider trading “is not
deceptive in the way we today insist on for 10b-5 liability.”302 He notes that
Chiarella overrules Texas Gulf Sulphur’s equal access principle but still
ignores the deception requirement problem for Rule 10b-5 liability.303
Donna Nagy claims that the personal benefit element does not include or
define many deceptive breaches of the duty of loyalty as illegal forms of
tipping.304 One wrongful type of permissible trade occurs when a fiduciary
discloses his intention to trade on the MNPI to the source.305 Similar to
Nagy, Matthew Guttentag argues that a personal benefit test is underinclusive
because situations may arise where deceptive conduct occurs but no personal
benefit or breach of fiduciary duty exists.306 Current insider trading
jurisprudence represents a complex patchwork approach that does not cover
all types of insider trading or MNPI tipping.307 Attempts to establish a
system that prevents all types of improper trades or requires blanket
disclosures would cause huge issues for the administration and enforcement
of regulations.308 Investors may face more harm from increased tax
expenditures for broader enforcement of regulations than from damages due
to insider trading.
If investors perceive harm from insider trading while conducting securities
transactions, members of the general public may lose confidence in securities
markets and withdraw participation altogether.309 John P. Anderson argues
against claims that a loss of confidence in securities markets produces a
chilling effect on investors’ willingness to participate because these claims
must be proven rather than assumed.310 Anderson cites a poll conducted in
1986 after an insider trading scandal; the poll’s responses showed that
although 67 percent of respondents believed that Wall Street commonly
engaged in insider trading, 55 percent stated that they would trade on an
inside tip.311 This suggests that while a majority of the general public
300. Scott, supra note 291, at 809.
301. See generally Michael D. Guttentag, Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 69
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believes insider trading occurs frequently, this will not stop most people from
participating in securities markets.
Bainbridge argues that without proof of investor injury, insider trading
should not undermine investor confidence in securities markets.312 Anderson
claims that empirical data does not support market confidence rationales for
insider trading bans.313 Anderson also anecdotally refers to Japan, which
enacted insider trading regulations in the 1980s and subsequently suffered a
market collapse and decrease in market liquidity.314 Anderson acknowledges
that a myriad of causes led to the collapse but uses this as a counterexample
to the suggestion that insider trading regulations inspire market confidence
and encourage individual investment.315
Instead of protecting investors, establishing fair markets, and encouraging
public participation in securities transactions, insider trading regulations may
have the opposite effect. Regulations that ban insider trading may reduce the
amount of accurate information available for investors, thereby reducing
investors’ desire to invest and, in turn, reducing available capital for efficient
market allocation.316 Although allowing insider trading may unfairly benefit
traders using MNPI to transact with uninformed investors, all investors
would still receive more information sooner and would trade using more
accurate pricing. Further, allowing insider trading might not change
investors’ perceptions of market unfairness. As a result, insider trading
regulations with tests that more easily find a personal benefit for a tipper may
negatively impact the development of open and efficient capital markets.
B. Beneficial Regulation and Protection Theories
Contrary to the potential benefits identified above of permitting insider
trading, insider trading can potentially harm individual investors and
negatively impact securities markets by increasing price spreads and
reducing liquidity. Part II.B.1 describes socially desirable and undesirable
forms of informed trading, the economic impact of desirable and undesirable
trading, and how current regulations work to prohibit undesirable or permit
desirable types of trading. Part II.B.1 also analyzes a proposal to reverse the
evidentiary burden, which requires the defendant to prove that no personal
benefit came from disclosure in order to prohibit more undesirable trades.
Part II.B.2 reviews William Wang’s analogy that compares insider trading to
a generic car defect for one make and model and argues that insider trading
causes harm to specific but anonymous individuals.
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1. Market Fairness and Desirable Informed Trading
While ITSA was under consideration in Congress in 1983, the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce submitted a report that stated that
unlawful use of MNPI is distinguishable from legitimate and beneficial
actions of securities professionals.317 New regulations should not inhibit any
Modeling earnings, ferreting out
legitimate analytical activities.318
information, and interviewing corporate officers and insiders represent
legitimate analytical activities conducted by securities professionals, and the
SEC agrees that these types of analyses help preserve a healthy market.319
Courts, the SEC, and Congress face a continuing challenge to create a
regulatory and enforcement system that prevents unlawful uses of MNPI for
securities transactions while still preserving analysts’ ability to conduct
legitimate and beneficial activities.
Fox, Glosten, and Rauterberg suggest that the real injury from insider
trading occurs from reduced liquidity, and such injury occurs regardless of
whether a tipper receives a personal benefit.320 Fox and his coauthors
support “fundamental value trading” as socially desirable, and they define
fundamental value trading as gathering and analyzing pieces of public
information to make a superior pricing assessment, which increases
economic efficiency.321 Fundamental value trading helps incentivize new
information through stock profits and improves stock price accuracy over
time.322 However, the authors conclude that other forms of informed trading,
such as announcement trading and insider trading, are socially undesirable
because they reduce liquidity, reduce fundamental value trading, allocate
resources inefficiently, and misallocate risks.323 The authors distinguish
undesirable trades based on issuer-generated material information from
socially desirable trades based on information from non-issuers.324
Based on these desirable goals, Fox, Glosten, and Rauterberg analyzed
current insider trading regulations and determined that Rule 10b-5 does not
prohibit fundamental value trading.325 For insider trading, the authors agree
that a personal benefit test combined with Reg FD operates as the best way
to convert “an anti-fraud rule into a policy-based regulation of informed
trading capable of protecting analyst interviews.”326 However, the authors
also believe that this test too often protects indirect tippees who execute
undesirable trades.327 To resolve this problem, the authors propose that
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tippers and tippees must provide persuasive evidence that the disclosure was
not for a Dirks-style personal benefit.328
The purpose for reversing the evidentiary burden onto the defendants
stems from obstacles in proving a personal benefit through a quid pro quo
relationship.329 Fox and his coauthors argue that evidence establishing a quid
pro quo benefit is hard to obtain.330 Tipping chains complicate the issue
because the government must then prove the indirect tippee knew of the quid
pro quo relationship.331 By contrast, proving a personal benefit through a
gift does not present a significant obstacle.332 For most gift cases, the
prosecution usually must only prove that a relationship exists in order to
show a personal benefit and, as in Salman, indirect tippees will be liable if
they knew of the relationship.333 The authors’ proposed burden reversal
would aid prosecutions for insider trading and deter more undesirable trades
from occurring while still protecting analysts’ ability to conduct interviews
for fundamental value trading.334 However, others argue against easing
liability requirements and protest that the elements of insider trading liability
should not cater to prosecutorial goals.335
2. Investor Protection
Although Manne and other scholars believe that individual investors suffer
no harm from insider trading,336 William Wang argues that a general harm
exists.337 Each act of insider trading causes harm to at least one individual
trader, but the victims are anonymous and cannot be identified.338
Wang analogizes the injury from insider trading to a generic car defect for
all cars of a certain model, like a 2019 Sedan sold by the Car Company.339
In such a scenario, an insider at the Car Company knows about the generic
defect (thus possessing MNPI) and sells her 2019 Sedan to a car dealer at the
existing market rate before the generic defect becomes publicly known and
causes the price for the 2019 Sedan to drop.340 The dealer may also sell a
2019 Sedan to another buyer before the defect becomes known.341 After the
announcement of the defect, the market price for all 2019 Sedans drops and
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the buyer now possesses less valuable property.342 The buyer appears to be
the victim as the transaction harms the buyer because the purchase price did
not reflect the value of the car, but the buyer is not definitively the victim.343
The buyer might have purchased a 2019 Sedan even if the Car Company
insider never sold her 2019 Sedan upon learning the MNPI about the
defect.344 As a result, the buyer may have been stuck with a less valuable car
regardless of the insider’s nondisclosure and insider trading violation.345
Alternatively, assume that the dealer buys the car from the insider before
the defect becomes known.346 The dealer chooses to lower the price on all
2019 Sedans to increase sales and decrease inventory.347 Although a buyer
of a 2019 Sedan may not purchase the insider’s car, the dealer’s decreased
prices to reduce inventory may have incentivized the buyer to purchase a
2019 Sedan.348 Because all 2019 Sedans have the same defect, the induced
buyer becomes the victim of the insider’s sale.349 Instead of inducing a
buyer, the dealer’s lower price for 2019 Sedans may preempt a potential
seller from selling her 2019 Sedan.350 This delay in selling may cause the
preempted seller to keep her 2019 Sedan until the defect becomes publicly
known, which makes the seller the victim.351 If the dealer’s price reductions
do not induce a buyer or preempt a seller, then the dealer holds a greater
inventory of 2019 Sedans than anticipated, and the dealer becomes the victim
after public announcement of the defect.352
In the final hypothetical, the dealer, an induced buyer, or a preempted
seller may all be victims depending on how they act and react to each other,
but only one victim actually exists from the sale of the insider’s car.353 To
determine the actual victim, one must know the price the dealer would have
charged for 2019 Sedans without buying the insider’s car and “how the public
would have reacted to these prices.”354 Such information is merely
speculative rather than known with certainty.355
This hypothetical translates to securities trades involving insider
trading.356 Each instance of insider trading affects the trading price for the
securities and creates at least one induced buyer or preempted seller.357
General knowledge that insider trading occurs in markets may cause stock
prices to decrease to help compensate buyers for the risk of being victims of
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insider trading for each trade.358 Despite this potential reduction in stock
prices, investors do not share insider trading losses equally and an insider
trading victim bears a disproportionate harm from the trade.359 This
corresponds to the last car hypothetical where the property of just one of the
parties (the dealer, induced buyer, or preempted seller) loses value after
announcement of the public defect.360
Although specific yet anonymous victims exist for each instance of insider
trading, investors who trade more frequently face disproportionate risks from
insider trading.361 The risk of becoming a victim of insider trading correlates
to the frequency at which one trades.362 Securities professionals and marketmakers who trade more frequently may pass these risks onto other investors
by widening their spreads for trades.363 The increased spreads reduce the
general public’s potential profit and may deter people from investing, which
reduces market liquidity for securities.364
Because insider trading can harm anonymous investors, increase investing
costs for all investors through larger transaction spreads, and deter
investments in securities, regulations that limit insider trading can help curb
these negative effects. Increased price spreads to offload risks of insider
trading may make securities prices less accurate compared to the value of the
securities.365 Although decreased prices for securities or increased spreads
can limit risk or partially compensate victims, victims still disproportionately
bear the costs and these measures can interfere with the efficient function of
capital markets.366 Because of the negative effects of insider trading noted
above, securities investors need regulations to limit the harm from insider
trading transactions. Tests that more easily find a tipper’s personal benefit
can accomplish this goal.
The contrast between the efficient capital markets theories and the investor
protection and market fairness theories shows the disagreement among
scholars over how to implement the most efficient and fair insider trading
regulatory system. The type of regulatory system affects how courts should
apply personal benefit tests for tippee insider trading liability. Tests that
make it harder to find a tipper’s personal benefit may help increase stock
price accuracy, give more information to investors faster, and encourage
public participation in capital markets without harming specific investors.367
However, this may also increase perceptions of rigged securities markets.368
By contrast, tests that use parameters that more easily show a personal benefit
can reduce the general market harm from insider trading, encourage socially
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desirable securities transactions, and prevent trades that reduce market
liquidity while still improving stock price accuracy by allowing fundamental
value trading.369 However, more liberal personal benefit tests may establish
underinclusive or overinclusive standards for insider trading liability and
enforcement, and administration costs may exceed any benefits of reduced
insider trading.370 This Note’s solution maintains much of the existing
jurisprudence, including the Dirks personal benefit requirement, while
harmonizing the applications of tests used for personal benefits involving a
gift or an intention to benefit a particular recipient.371
III. NEW TESTS FOR NONPECUNIARY PERSONAL BENEFITS
This Note argues that different factual situations support the need for two
distinct tests for nonpecuniary personal benefits: one test for gifts and one
test for an intention to benefit a particular recipient. The two tests would
operate as complementary theories of liability, similar to the classical and
misappropriation theories. The new test for finding a personal benefit from
a gift of MNPI would apply to all people, not just close friends or family, and
would require prosecutors to show evidence of the tipper’s intention to gift
the MNPI. The new test for intention to benefit a particular recipient
establishes a rebuttable presumption of legitimacy for any disclosure. This
Note also recommends that courts should instruct juries that tipper personal
benefits are a separate and necessary element of insider trading liability.
Currently, the Second Circuit requires a meaningfully close personal
relationship for tippee liability under gift theory, but this creates an
underinclusive test.372 For example, if an insider shares MNPI with a
stranger on the street who then trades on that information, the stranger likely
would not face criminal liability under Newman because no meaningfully
close personal relationship exists. In this example, arguing that the tip
intended to benefit the stranger provides more support for liability than
arguing that the tipper shared the MNPI as a gift. By invoking the two
distinct tests proposed in this Note, prosecutors would be able to pursue more
instances of improper disclosures that result in insider trading.
Part III.A identifies and explains the new test for finding a personal benefit
from a gift. Part III.B identifies and explains the new test for finding an
intention to benefit a particular recipient. Part III.C then analyzes how each
of the new tests promotes economic efficiency and stock price accuracy while
still protecting investors and fairness in securities markets.
A. Focusing on Scienter for Gifts
Starting with gifts of MNPI, this Note argues that a new test for finding
that a gift conferred a personal benefit should focus on a scienter element—
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that the tipper intended to give a gift—and not on the closeness of the
relationship between tipper and tippee. The Dirks personal benefit test
intended to establish objective criteria for improper disclosures.373 Standards
that focus on either the tipper’s intent to give a gift or on finding a sufficiently
close relationship between tipper and tippee both involve subjective
determinations of fact. Determining the tipper’s intent to give a gift requires
a subjective finding of the tipper’s state of mind. A determination regarding
the closeness of the tipper-tippee relationship to infer a gift is also subjective.
Because both standards require subjective findings, this Note makes no
attempt to evaluate which standard operates more objectively. However,
determining a tipper’s intent to gift information more closely aligns with
Dirks’s overall goal of distinguishing between improper and proper
disclosures. This new test extends liability beyond just close friends and
family and applies to any tippees who receive MNPI as a gift from a tipper.
Many criminal statutes require mens rea determinations and juries can
usually infer the defendant’s intent from her actions. Insider trading laws
should also allow juries to weigh evidence and infer intent. Juries must
weigh the evidence presented and evaluate arguments to determine their
credibility. To help a jury find the tipper’s intent, the following list provides
some examples of actions that suggest an intent to gift the MNPI.
If the tippee requests the information in lieu of cash, as happened in
Salman between Michael and Maher, then the jury should infer the tipper’s
intent to give a gift.374 If shortly after completing the trade and realizing the
profit, the tippee loans or gives the tipper more than 10 percent of the profits
from the trade, the jury should infer an intent to gift the MNPI. If the tippee
sends the tipper any nonmonetary item in exchange for the information, then
the jury should infer the tipper’s intent to give a gift. If the tipper discloses
the information close to the recipient’s birthday or a holiday known for gift
exchanges, then the jury may infer the tipper’s intent to gift.
Although the Supreme Court on multiple occasions rejected the idea that
liability for gifting MNPI should apply to all people and not just friends and
family,375 the above examples also suggest that a friendship exists between
the tipper and the tippee. This Note generally agrees with Abigail Bush’s
claim that the current application of gift theory represents the minimum
personal benefit for the tipper.376 However, this Note disagrees that the
“meaningfully close personal relationship” element from Newman represents
the best available test to narrow the applicable relationships.377 The
examples listed above provide evidence that the tipper intended the
disclosure as a gift or that the tippee intended the tipper to share the proceeds
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of the tip, both of which satisfy the intent component of Dirks’s personal
benefit requirement.378
Despite broadening liability for the personal benefit requirement for gifts
to all people, this Note disagrees with the Supreme Court’s implication from
Salman that finding a gift between the original tipper and tippee should taint
the entire tipping chain.379 Nevertheless, the prosecution can still satisfy the
burden of proof through evidence that the original tipper intended to gift the
MNPI to a remote tippee or that the original tippee then intended to gift the
information to a remote tippee.380 Requiring evidence proving an intent to
give a gift helps solve the scienter problem for tipping chains where the
remote tippee may not know the identity of the original tipper. If the
prosecution cannot produce evidence showing an intent to gift the MNPI,
then it must use the complementary test to argue that the tipper intended to
benefit a particular recipient in order to convict the defendant.381 In cases
like Salman, the government could raise alternative theories of liability under
both the gift and intention-to-benefit tests. Allowing the government to raise
alternative theories for finding a personal benefit would avoid the liability
substitution issue that arose between the Martoma I and Martoma II
decisions.
A hypothetical concerning two former coworkers illustrates the
application of the new personal benefit test for gifts. Imagine that two
coworkers used to work for the same employer, but one leaves and becomes
a corporate insider for a different employer. Because of her corporate
position, the insider obtains MNPI which she then shares with her former
coworker. In addition to tipping the information, the insider sends an email
to her former coworker stating that she hopes that the information will benefit
the coworker’s career. The email provides evidence of the insider’s intent to
gift the MNPI. The insider benefitted because she helped the coworker’s
career prospects. A prosecutor would not have to prove a close relationship
between the insider and the coworker. Alternatively, if the insider did not
send an email to the coworker and no other evidence exists showing the
insider’s intent to gift the MNPI, the prosecutor could still convict the
coworker using an argument that the insider intended to benefit the coworker.
B. A Presumption of Legitimacy for Benefiting a Particular Recipient
This Note believes that insider trading jurisprudence should support the
general principle that prosecutors must prove charges beyond a reasonable
doubt. Although Fox, Glosten, and Rauterberg argue that the evidentiary
burden should be reversed to more effectively deter and prosecute
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economically harmful insider trading transactions,382 this Note agrees with
Almousa that insider trading regulations should not cater to prosecutorial
goals.383 Although this may enable some liable traders to escape punishment,
this also conforms with constitutional protections for criminal defendants.
Instead, this Note proposes a new test that establishes a rebuttable
presumption of legitimacy for disclosures prosecuted under an “intention to
benefit a particular recipient” theory. Under this test, all prosecutions begin
with the presumption that the tipper disclosed the MNPI for a legitimate or
proper purpose. The prosecution must then introduce evidence that the tipper
disclosed the MNPI for an illegitimate or improper purpose. If the
prosecution fails to provide any evidence at an evidentiary hearing before
trial, the judge must dismiss the charges. If the judge finds that the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence, the case will proceed to trial. At
trial, if the defense produces no evidence supporting the legitimacy of the
disclosure, then the judge should recommend that the jury convict the
defendant. If the defense produces such evidence, the issue becomes a matter
of fact for the jury to decide. Similar to the new test for gifts of MNPI, this
test aligns with Dirks’s goal of distinguishing proper from improper
disclosures.384
Proper disclosures include any circumstances where the tipper discloses
the information for a corporate benefit, the disclosure exposes fraudulent
activity, or an inadvertent disclosure occurred and the corporation
subsequently complied with Reg FD.385 Disclosure for a corporate benefit
occurs, for example, when an insider discloses the information to an investorrelations team. The insider expects that the investor-relations team will not
trade on the information or share the information with other traders. Instead
the insider discloses the information so that once the information becomes
public, the investor-relations team can help to soften stock price drops when
earnings statements fail to meet quarterly expectations or help to increase
stock prices if earnings exceed expectations. This corresponds with goals of
achieving accurate pricing and efficient allocation of resources for securities
However, if the investor-relations team discloses the
offerings.386
information to other tippees who trade before the information becomes
public, then those tippees become liable because the investor-relations team
intended for those tippees to benefit. If a tipping chain discloses the
information to several recipients for a corporate benefit, a remote tippee
remains liable once the disclosure no longer occurs for a corporate benefit.
The improper purpose test helps resolve the issue from Newman where the
trading tippees were several levels removed from the original tippers.387
Disclosure to expose corporate frauds should follow the Dirks line of
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reasoning.388 The protection for inadvertent disclosures avoids chilling
analyst interviews and additionally helps enforcement of Reg FD.
Some examples of improper disclosures include giving tips to institutional
investors to curry favor, telling people they can make a lot of money trading
on the information, and tipping a sad-looking stranger to help improve that
stranger’s day. Repeated disclosures to the same investor also support an
inference of impropriety. While some of these examples could arguably
create liability if the tips were intended as gifts, the intention-to-benefit test,
operating as an alternative liability theory, corresponds with the Supreme
Court’s limitation that tippee liability for gifts should only apply to close
friends and family.389 The intention-to-benefit test ensures a pathway for
prosecutors to hold such traders liable for these economically harmful types
of trades, reduces the focus on the scienter necessary for gift convictions, and
still protects traders’ constitutional rights. Treating a gift and an intention to
benefit a particular recipient as complementary liability theories corresponds
with the complementary treatment of the classical and misappropriation
theories.390 Additionally, this eliminates the requirement that the prosecution
prove that remote tippees knew or should have known that the original
corporate insider tipped the MNPI, if the prosecution can show that the
trading tippee knew or should have known that the immediate tipper
improperly disclosed the information. Finally, the rebuttable presumption
test helps alleviate evidentiary problems that occur from requiring evidence
suggesting a quid pro quo relationship.391
C. The New Standards Would Promote Fairness and Efficiency in Capital
Markets
The new personal benefit test for gifts would help improve the accuracy of
securities prices. Even though the new test broadens gift theory liability
beyond just close friends and family members, it would also require
prosecutors to introduce more evidence to prove the intent of the tipper to
give a gift rather than just showing evidence of a close relationship.
Requiring more evidence makes it harder for prosecutors to show a personal
benefit and will likely reduce insider trading convictions under a gift liability
theory. Fewer convictions will mean that more insider trades will escape
punishment, which will deter fewer people from engaging in insider trading.
This, in turn, means that more trading will likely occur and this will gradually
push the stock price closer to the value of the securities.392 The benefit
derived from the higher evidentiary burden placed on prosecutors seeking
convictions under this new gift theory liability will be limited, however,
because the separate intention-to-benefit test still provides an alternative
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liability theory that prevents inside trades and punishes people who conduct
transactions using improper disclosures.
Although the new personal benefit for gifts standard may reduce
convictions for insider trading, it does not reduce protections for investors or
encourage more types of harmful trades. The new test still aligns with
Dirks’s goal of preventing gifts of MNPI to trading friends or relatives,
despite broadening gift theory beyond just these individuals. The new test
merely removes the easiest pathway for prosecutors to prove that a tipper
personally benefits and increases the evidentiary burden for liability, as
suggested in Newman.393
The separate test for intending to benefit a particular recipient will also
help improve the accuracy of securities prices. Although a separate
“intention-to-benefit” test may further limit pricing benefits, it also reduces
the risk of becoming a victim of insider trading. The reduced risk benefits
high-frequency traders and should reduce spreads when general investors
transact with these professionals.394 Lower spreads increase the accuracy of
stock prices and help securities markets to function more efficiently.
The new intention-to-benefit test would also protect investors and
promotes fairness in securities markets. The test would require proof of an
improper purpose for any disclosure of MNPI. Like the new personal benefit
test for gifts, the intention-to-benefit test will align with the Dirks’s goals
because it does not impose liability on people who disclose MNPI for a
proper purpose. The intention-to-benefit test also recognizes the general
market harm caused by improper disclosures of MNPI, and criminal liability
should dissuade investors from engaging in these harmful transactions.395
Although the intention-to-benefit test should deter harmful transactions, it
still permits beneficial transactions.396
Neither the new gift test nor intention-to-benefit test would add new
restrictions that limit securities professionals’ ability to conduct legitimate
and beneficial activities. The new tests would not ban or limit fundamental
value trading.397 The new tests would still allow securities analysts to
conduct research, model financial statements, interview corporate officers,
and make analytical judgments. These beneficial activities help maintain
healthy stock markets.398 Lastly, the new personal benefit tests would follow
the principle articulated in Chiarella and Dirks that securities regulations do
not require equal access to information and that laws should encourage
traders to piece information together to make superior analytical
judgments.399
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CONCLUSION
This Note supports the Dirks elements for insider trading convictions but
proposes two new and distinct tests for determining nonpecuniary personal
benefits. The new test for finding a personal benefit from a gift of MNPI
would require prosecutors to show evidence of the tipper’s intention to gift
the MNPI. This test would apply to all people, rather than only to people
with a meaningfully close personal relationship with the tipper. The new test
for intending to benefit a particular recipient would establish a rebuttable
presumption of legitimacy for any disclosure.
Tests that more easily find that a tipper received a personal benefit expand
liability for insider trading. More liberal personal benefit tests can protect
individual investors from harm, reduce price spreads for securities
transactions, deter socially undesirable trades (and encourage socially
desirable trades), and increase liquidity for securities and capital market
investments. By contrast, tests that make tipper personal benefits harder to
find limit insider trading liability and permit more legal insider trading. More
permissible insider trading can improve stock price accuracy, give investors
more information sooner, and reduce enforcement and administration costs
while not causing any perceptible harm to investors or reducing public
confidence in securities markets.
The two complementary nonpecuniary personal benefit tests correspond
with the goals of insider trading jurisprudence. Requiring evidence that
shows an intent to gift MNPI or an intent to benefit a particular recipient
aligns with Dirks’s goal of separating improper from proper disclosures. The
new tests would also align with Chiarella’s principle that securities laws do
not require equal access to information. The new tests would still permit and
encourage analytical activities that benefit securities markets, such as
interviewing corporate officers and discovering information to make better
analytical judgments. Finally, the new tests would still protect investors from
becoming victims of insider trading, which should reduce transaction spreads
for high-frequency traders and improve the price accuracy of securities.
Because of the benefits identified above, complementary tests of liability for
gifts of MNPI and an intention to benefit a particular recipient would resolve
courts’ recent struggles in applying nonpecuniary personal benefit tests.

